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 The Tunisian uprisings of December 17, 2010-January 14, 2011, which resulted in the 
departure of President Ben Ali from the country, began a new political era for Tunisians. In 
particular the legal structures of the authoritarian regime now seemed ripe for deep 
transformations: soon after the departure of Ben Ali, street demonstrators asked for the election 
of a Constituent Assembly that would draft a new constitution. Slogans and posters read: “A 
Constituent Assembly to change the constitution,” and “Cancel the constitution: it is a duty.”1 
During this extraordinary and ephemeral political moment, it seemed that Tunisians could 
reconfigure their legal structures and start anew, given that they were united in a consensus 
against the old structures of the authoritarian regime and the provisory government. For many 
Tunisians, Tunisia’s 1959 constitution had to be abrogated and replaced by a democratic one. In 
spite of diverging views on this matter among political and legal elites, on March 3, 2011, the 
interim president of the republic announced the election of a constituent assembly for the 
summer of 2011.  
                                                
I thank Winnifred Sullivan, Lori Beaman, Lucette Valensi and Kirsten Wesselfhoeft for their insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
1 Céline Lussato “La révolution tunisienne n’est pas terminée,” La Nouvel Observateur, February 1, 2011, 
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/actualite/monde/20110221.OBS8387/reportage-la-revolution-tunisienne-n-est-pas-
terminee.html	  (accessed	  June	  6,	  2011). 
 If the desire for democracy seemed to be the most important aim uniting all Tunisians on 
and after January 14, the question of what democracy meant involved more contentious matters, 
particularly with respect to religion. Remarkably absent during the uprisings, Islam came to the 
fore afterwards as a crucial factor in public deliberations on two fronts: the future constitution 
and family law. It seemed that the future of democracy could not be discussed outside of these 
two interrelated questions. More specifically, debates over the relationship between the state and 
religion and over the status of women in a democratic Tunisia brought Islam to the center of the 
nascent political debate. Two questions raised high anxieties in the media and among the 
population, prompting news articles and even demonstrations in the street. The first was: would 
the emergence of a democratic system be accompanied by a separation of state and religion, 
hence leading to the elimination of the 1959 constitution’s Article 1 stating that “Tunisia is a 
free, independent and sovereign state. Its language is Arabic, its religion is Islam, and its regime 
is the Republic”?2  Second, would democracy “bring back sharia,” and thereby endanger the 
advancements in women's rights since independence?  
These two questions implicitly assumed that since the post-colonial reforms of family law 
had been imposed through authoritarian state policies, the advent of democracy would lead to the 
return of “sharia.” Among secularists, it was thought that religion, which the authoritarian state 
had repressed for a long time, could no longer be controlled and censored by a more democratic 
state and therefore posed a danger for social peace. For the secularists, since Islam had been 
repressed for so long, its comeback would certainly be somewhat violent and constitute a threat 
                                                
2 Tunisian Republic, Munāqashāt al-majlis al-qawmī al-ta’sīsī, Markiz al-buḥūth wa’l-dirāsāt al-barlamānīya, vol. 2 
(Bardo, 2009), 355.  
 
to all the progressive values that had been at the center of policy making, even if they had been 
enforced by a dictatorship. For the Islamists, this return of Islam to the public scene would not be 
an obstacle for democracy, but would rather allow for the public re-emergence of an Islamic 
identity that had been marginalized for decades. However, in the discussions that took place 
around this issue among prominent political activists, the concept of sharia as the foundation for 
legislation was rejected not only by secularists, but also by mainstream Islamists belonging to the 
newly legalized al-Nahdha party.  
Coming back to Tunisia after twenty years of exile, Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the 
Islamist al-Nahdha, declared on January 30, 2011, that “sharia had no place in Tunisia.”3 In the 
election of October 23, 2011, al-Nahdha won 40 percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly 
and allied with two smaller parties of the center-left to form a new government. In the middle of 
March 2012, while the Constitutional Committee charged with drafting the preamble of the 
constitution was tackling the question of Islam, tensions heightened in the streets. Islamists of all 
stripes—from members of al-Nahdha to Salafist groups—demonstrated in favor of including 
sharia law in the constitution. They expressed themselves against those who thought that Article 
1 was sufficient because sharia was not needed and even posed a threat for democracy and 
women’s rights. This tension was in part resolved by a vote among the leadership of al-Nahdha 
in favor of keeping Article 1 without mentioning sharia law. On March 26, 2012, the Islamist 
party published a communiqué stating that “the formulation of the 1959 constitution’s article 1… 
is clear and is agreed upon by all the components of society. This article preserves the Arab and 
                                                
3 “Tunisie: L’islamiste Rached Ghannouchi ne briguera pas la présidence,” Le	   Parisien, January 30, 2011. 
http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-monde/rached-ghannouchi-le-visage-de-l-islamisme-tunisien-rentre-au-pays-30-
01-2011-1277385.php ( accessed July 22, 2011).  
Islamic identity of the Tunisian state. At the same time, it confirms the civil and democratic 
character of the state.”4  On the same day, Rached Ghannouchi called a press conference during 
which he explained the choice made by al-Nahdha, a choice approved by 53 votes against 13 in 
the Founding Committee of the party: “these recent days, a controversy arose about the mention 
of sharia law in the future constitution, to the point that society almost split ideologically 
between the pro and anti-sharia. In reality, 90% of the Tunisian law is in conformity with sharia 
law.”5   
Within the Islamist party, some disagreed with this decision. As Riadh Chaïbi, Chairman 
of the Organizing Committee of the ninth congress of al-Nahdha told me:  
It was quite difficult [to make this decision]. There is an emotional aspect about 
the issue of sharia. It is about affects. Of course, there is a tendency to become 
attached to names without paying attention to content. The word “sharia” is a 
word deeply rooted in intellectual history, in the history of Islam. There is no one 
anymore who can say that they are against sharia if they claim an Islamic 
reference… We are not saying that Sharia is not part of our thought or that we do 
not recognize sharia. We only said that we would not mention it in the 
constitution. We want to search for new forms of the meaning of sharia. (…) If 
sharia becomes the source of legislation, and if a secularist party wins the election 
with a majority, will the assembly take that party to the constitutional court? 
Would this contradict democracy? (…) These are very important questions for 
us.6  
                                                
4 Al-Nahdha Party, Bayān, Tunis, March 26, 2012. 
5 Rached Ghannouchi, Press Conference, March 26, 2012. Quoted in Leaders, March 26, 2012, 
http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/pourquoi-ennahdha-a-accepte-le-maintien-de-l-article-1er-de-la-constitution-de-
1959?id=8023 (accessed October 16, 2012). 
6 Interview with Riadh Chaibi, May 30, 2012, Tunis.  
While it seemed logical for secularists to refuse sharia as the basis of the law, such a decision 
might seem surprising coming from Islamists. Al-Nahdha’s position was all the more surprising 
given that polls showed that the majority of Tunisian public opinion was in favor of sharia being 
a source, but not the only source, of legislation.7 Perhaps equally surprisingly, secularists 
accepted that Islam remain “the religion of the state,” thereby shunning the principle of the 
separation of state and religion as a prerequisite for democracy. For instance, Riadh Guerfali, a 
Tunisian specialist of public law, wrote in the Tunisian blog Nawaat, which played a crucial role 
during the uprising, that the statement “Islam is the religion of the state” actually guaranteed 
secular democracy.8 I will come back to this line of reasoning later in this chapter. Here again the 
secularists and the Islamists from al-Nahdha broadly agreed on the project of democracy 
combined with religious establishment and secular law. While the issue of a return of sharia as a 
foundation for legislation was very present in the news in Tunisia during this time, no major 
political party or activist seemed inclined to challenge Article 1 of the Constitution or the 
advances made on women’s legal status through secular law since 1956. 
 This concordance of views can partly be analyzed as a political compromise reached by 
secularists and Islamists in order to survive a transitional period during which risks of instability 
might threaten all political groups. However, this chapter argues that there are also deep 
                                                
7 Gallup, “After the Arab Uprisings: Women on Rights, Religion, and Rebuilding,” Summer 2012. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155009/Uprisings-Women-Rights-Religion-Rebuilding.aspx (accessed October 29, 2012). 
On the question of popular legal consciousness and Muslim legal theory, see Tamir Moustapha, “Islamic Law, Women’s 
Rights, and Popular Legal Consciouness in Malaysia,” forthcoming in Law and Social Inquiry.  
8 See, for instance, Riadh Guerfali, “‘L’islam religion d’Etat’. Disposition constitutionnelle garante du processus 
séculariste de la démocratie tunisienne,” March 31, 2011, http://nawaat.org/portail/2011/03/31/islam-religion-detat-
disposition-constitutionnelle-garante-du-processus-seculariste-de-la-democratie-tunisienne/ (accessed July 22, 2011). 
historical reasons for such a broad convergence, and describes the subtle and ambiguous ways in 
which secularists and Islamists continue to diverge in their views on Islam and the state. These 
two mutually antagonistic groups speak within a single framework whose principles shape the 
strategies and narratives of both sides. This framework is the end result of a radical 
transformation of the relations between Islam, sharia, and the state during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, a transformation that undermined the role of sharia and reduced it to an 
obscure and unstable place in conceptions of secular law. The gradually diminishing role of 
sharia under the aegis of the modern state explains why the notion of sharia as a foundation for 
law is illegible for the Islamists as well as for the secularists. The colonial and post-colonial 
Tunisian state progressively transformed sharia from a revealed source that operated as a guiding 
principle for adjudication by the jurist into an implicit point of reference regulating the 
interaction of two specific domains—the state and the family—that state elites saw as tightly 
connected. 
  This shift from sharia as a guiding principle for the jurist to the “implicit sharia” as a 
distant reference for the law is related to the growing role of the modern state as a legislator that 
uses the law to fashion the private lives of its subjects in order to make them “modern” citizens 
who live in the shadow of a state whose identity is “Muslim.” As underlined by Wael Hallaq,  
 
The demise of the shari'a was ushered in by the material internalization of 
the concept of nationalism in Muslim countries, mainly by the creation of 
the nation-state. This transformation in the role of the state is perhaps the 
most crucial fact about the so-called legal reforms. Whereas the traditional 
ruler considered himself subject to the law and left the judicial and 
legislative functions and authority to the 'ulama, the modern state reversed 
this principle, thereby assuming the authority that dictated what the law is 
or is not.9  
In the case of Tunisia, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the fiction of the 
independent jurist was maintained in the official language of the law, whereas in reality the 
sovereign encroached on sharia law. After independence the state became the legislator, using 
the secular law as an instrument authoritatively to change family life from a patriarchal structure 
to a model of increased gender equality.10 Despite its narratives of “women’s rights” and 
“women’s emancipation,” the authoritarian state was in fact far from “liberating” women, since 
it was exercising its implacable authority on all citizens of Tunisia.  
 This enterprise of social transformation was a project of domestication of practices and 
forms of life that had thus far escaped the state’s regulation. Sharia law, with its jurisprudential 
expressions, represented one of these forms. In a 1965 speech given in Ankara, Habib 
Bourguiba, president of Tunisia from 1957 to 1987, subtly described the transformation that had 
been at play before him and for which he would continue to advocate.  He presented it as a 
compromise that would not lead to separation of state and religion:  
 
Let us not forget that for the Arabs, religion preceded the state. Before the state, religion 
legislated. By the side of the state, and with the state, religion must guide, inspire, and 
                                                
9 Wael Hallaq, “Can the Sharia be restored?” in Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser Islamic Law and the 
Challenges of Modernity, eds Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser (Walnut Creek, Altamira Press, 2004), 21-
53. 
10 For a comparative analysis of these transformations in Northern Africa, see Mounira Charrad, States and Women's 
Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, University of California Press, 2001. 
harmonize. We consider these two entities [the state and religion] to be complementary, 
not contradictory, and it appears to us more legitimate to unite them than to separate 
them.11  
 
In this new framework characterized by the central presence of the modern state—and by the 
idea of a “unity” of religion and state—the state took on the role of legislator. It relegated 
sharia—conspicuously absent from Bourguiba’s 1965 speech—to an uncertain and precarious 
role while making “Islam” as a religion an object to regulate as well as the foundation of its own 
identity. After the uprisings of 2010-2011, it was within this framework of religious 
establishment and secular law that all Tunisian political elites, including the leadership of al-
Nahdha party, understood the marked role of Islam in the state—a by-product of colonial and 
post-colonial state interventions, rather than the result of the presence and the activism of the 
Islamists themselves. They all accepted the role of religion in the Constitution, but made sharia 
at most a “reference” that had participated historically in the modern state’s formulation of the 
secular law, if not merely a thing of the past that had disappeared.   
To understand the common framework under which the al-Nahdha party and Tunisian 
secularists operate, I explain in part I how, starting in the 19th century, a new legal regime made 
sharia progressively “implicit” in Tunisia. In part II, I examine the legal debates about the 
significance of sharia in Tunisian law in post-colonial times. In part III, I show how, in post Ben 
                                                
11 Quoted in Ahmed Mestiri, Preface to Nazli Hafsia, Le contrat de mariage en Tunisie jusqu’à 1956 (Carthaginoiseries, 
Tunis, 2005), 8.  
 
Ali Tunisia, religious establishment, rather than sharia law, provides the tools that the al-Nahdha 
Party uses to protect and reinforce the Islamic identity of the Tunisian state and society . 
 
I. The Genealogy of Family Law Codification: the Implicit Sharia 
 In nineteenth-century Tunisia, a movement for codification of the law was initiated and 
encouraged by state administrators and reformers such as Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi and foreign 
agents, in particular British and French consuls. It was inspired by a deep dissatisfaction with the 
state of affairs of the legal system. The Europeans criticized the perceived disorder and 
arbitrariness of the legal system, which prevented them from conducting business in the country 
in the way they saw fit. They pressured the Bey of Tunis to proclaim the Security Pact (1857) 
and the Constitution (1861), which reformed the legal status of all residents of the Regency. The 
security pact of 1857 guaranteed the equality of all residents of the Regency regardless of their 
“religion,” their language, and their “color” (al-adyān, al-alsina, wa’l-alwān).12 The Constitution 
of 1861 established new tribunals that would adjudicate on commercial and criminal issues.  
These issues were thereafter taken out of the purview of the Bey’s personal judiciary and out of 
the sharia tribunals.13  
Between 1856 and 1876, the Bey’s government reorganized the sharia tribunals by 
circumscribing their domain to that of family law, endowments, and property, and by formalizing 
their operations in more official structures.14 Thus, before the occupation of Tunisia by the 
                                                
12 Qānūn al-dawla, (Tunis: Matba ‘at al-dawla al-Tūnisīya, 1861), 6.  
13 Therese Womble, Early Constitutionalism in Tunisia, 1857-1864: Reform and Revolt. PhD diss., (Princeton 
University, 1997). 
14 A. Sébaut, Dictionnaire de législation tunisienne (Paris : Marchal et Billard éditeurs, 1888) 212. See also Bahri 
Guiga, Essai sur l’évolution du Charaa et son application judiciaire en Tunisie (Paris : Jouve et Compagnie Editeurs, 
French, sharia tribunals were already limited to a domain that the French authorities would only 
shrink further during their presence in Tunisia (1881-1956). Th French eliminated property rights 
and real estate issues from the purview of the sharia tribunals in order to control land more 
easily. Family law remained the domain of the qadis, however, who adjudicated through their 
traditional system of jurisprudence based on either Maliki or Hanafi law, while the rest of the 
legal system was subject to recently published codes.  In the eyes of the French authorities and of 
many Tunisian jurists, this legal dualism had many faults: in particular the new context of the 
modern state made it necessary to formalize the institutions of marriage and divorce under the 
state’s own aegis and made Muslim law, which kept family matters regulated in informal ways 
and out of the control of the state, an anomaly. 
The Tunisian reformists at times conformed to European demands, since the legal texts of 
1857 and 1861 intended to counter the sovereign’s despotism, but with a true dislike for the 
French and British attempts to dictate their terms to the Regency. Using the same narratives as 
other reformists such as Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, they denounced the obscurity of the shar'i 
legal process, its lack of standardization, and its consequent arbitrariness. For the ulama who 
expressed their desire to reform the legal system and codify sharia, it was not that sharia was 
impossible to implement, but simply that the ad hoc process that characterized sharia courts was 
                                                                                                                                                             
1930); Robert Brunschvig, “Justice laïque et justice religieuse dans la Tunisie des Deys et des Beys jusqu’au milieu du 
XIXème siècle,” Studia Islamica 23 (1965) : 27-70. For a historical testimony on these legal transformations, see Ahmad 
Ibn Abi Diyaf, Itḥāf ahl al-zamān bi-akhbār mulūk tūnis wa ‘ahd al-amān, al-dār al-‘arabiyya lil-kitāb, (Tunis: al-
Maṭbaʻah al-Rasmīyah lil-Jumhūrīya al-Tūnisīyah, 1063-1966). The most detailed second-hand account is in Muhammad 
Bouzghiba, Harakat Taqnīn al-fiqh al-islāmī bi’l-bilād al-tūnisiyya (1857-1965), (Tunis: Markiz al-nashr al-jāmi‘ī, 
2003). 
 
not legible anymore: it appeared disorganized and was viewed as corrupt and unjust. This, they 
explained, was not a result of the substance of the sharia but rather of the procedures through 
which it was implemented.  There was a need to codify the law into a standardized text—as 
opposed to a stock of compendia written by medieval jurists and only known to and 
understandable by a few specialists—in order for it to be accessible to both judges and litigants. 
In his 1922 essay Martyr Tunisia, addressed to the French public as a request for full Tunisian 
sovereignty, Shaykh Abdelaziz al-Thaalibi dedicated a chapter to the justice system. He 
described the judicial organization of Tunisia as “a monstrous monument of insecurity and 
injustice.… There is not one system of justice in Tunisia: there are five systems of justice:  a 
French system of justice that represents French sovereignty, a Tunisian-Muslim system, a Jewish 
system, a secular system and a mixed (French-Tunisian) system.” Commenting on the Muslim 
sharia court (what he called the “Tunisian-Muslim system”) he described it as “archaic.” “Its 
difficult situation,” he wrote,  
is not caused by Muslim law itself, but by the poor organization of this 
court and the lack of codes… The procedure is dense and inextricable. The 
judge does not adjudicate according to his opinion and he has no power of 
appreciation. He is bound to a system of legal proofs. … In order to prove a 
fact, as well as to challenge it, there is a need for at least two witnesses. 
Hence the number of witnesses in a trial might increase indefinitely… and 
the trial might last for years, sometimes generations! … Contrary to the 
exigencies of Muslim law, the judgments are never justified. There is no 
administrative organization, nothing is filed, the titles of the defendants are 
lost on the benches, at the judges’ homes, or in the notaries’ offices. And on 
top of all of this, there is no clerk at the hearings. … At the hearings, 
nothing is registered in writing. Errors are easy to make for it is often 
difficult for the court to remember the meaning of its judgment… The 
[French] government follows with a passionate interest the decline of our 
system of justice. [The French government] holds in its power, through the 
most minute details of our family life and properties, the destiny of our 
society.15   
This was not an isolated criticism of the operations of the sharia courts—it echoed earlier 
objections both in Tunisia and in other Muslim societies in the Middle East.16  The colonial state 
was also in need of a more controllable system of justice. In 1948, Shaykh Abdelaziz Djait, who 
was minister of Justice and Shaykh al-Islam—the highest religious position in the realm—
codified family law in order to integrate it in one text. In doing so he was both following the 
requests of French authorities and acting upon a desire to rationalize and standardize the law that 
seemed to be commonly shared among jurists, as illustrated by al-Thaalibi’s evaluation of sharia 
courts. The project was declared necessary to produce a standardized set of rules. Its stated aim 
was to remedy the poor situation of the sharia courts in which judges adjudicated according to 
their personal whims and defendants took advantage of the existence of two schools of law to 
maximize their interests.17 
                                                
15 Abdelaziz al-Thaalibi, La Tunisie martyre (Paris : Jouve et Companie éditeurs, 1922), 52-53. 
16 Muhammad Abduh, Taqrīr fī iṣlāḥ al-maḥākim al-shar‘iyya (Cairo : Al-manār press, 1900). 
17 The defendant could chose to be tried in a Hanafi or Maliki court of law, and even switch in mid trial, especially if the 
outcome of the trial was becoming unfavorable. 
 The “Djait Code”18 was drafted by a large committee composed of ulama, lawyers, 
journalists, and intellectuals working under the patronage of the Ministry of Justice. It dealt with 
land ownership and personal status issues and summarized the principal provisions of the 
Malikite and Hanafite schools of law in these two domains. It was never applied under the 
French protectorate, but its form and content help make clear the transformation at play in 
Muslim law in twentieth-century Tunisia. The text was organized into two columns, one for the 
Hanafi interpretation—a remnant of Ottoman influence—and the other for the Maliki school of 
law, the principal school of law in Tunisia.  The columns at times contained empty parts when 
one school presented specific provisions on one issue with which the other school did not deal. 
From this foundation the judges were supposed to draw their own judgments.  They could chose 
to refer to either one of the two columns, since these were not to be read as two “competing” 
interpretations, but rather as two collections of possible references that could be combined. 
While the Djait Code was never used in courts, it served as a template for the new Personal 
Status law drafted by the independent Tunisian state in 1956.  
 
 In 1956, Bourguiba instituted the Personal Status Code (PSC, or majallat al-aḥwāl al-
shakhṣīya). It was registered in the Gazette (al-rā’id al-rasmī) on August 13, 1956, five months 
after the independence of Tunisia, and began to be applied in January 1957. While the 
Constituent Assembly, which also operated as a legislative body, began to convene on April 8, 
1956, the text of the Code was neither discussed nor presented to the vote of the members of the 
                                                
18 Lā’iḥat majallat al-aḥkām al-shar‘īya (Tunis: Matba‘at al-idāra, n.d.). 
Assembly.19 Rather, it was imposed by Bourguiba and his closest aides outside of the 
deliberative arena of the Constituent Assembly.  However, the Code was in fact an object of deep 
contention. Had it been brought before the Assembly, discussion certainly would have been 
heated, as shown by the opposition to the new Code echoed by the press at the time. In particular 
the newspaper al-Istiqlāl voiced the strong disapproval of many conservative ulama from the 
Zaytūna University. Responding to a request for a fatwa on the new Code, Djait published his 
opinion in the fall of 1956 in al-Istiqlāl. Holding an official position within the state’s 
administration, he did not want to be perceived as frontally opposing the government and as a 
trouble maker. In a style typical of ulama’s respectful but critical advice to the political 
authorities, he wrote: 
I say to those who requested a fatwā that it is not lawful for the sincere 
believer to cause discord, which spreads dissension, provokes hatred and 
resentment and destroys the nation’s unity. Indeed, it leads to public 
damage (adhrār ‘āmma) and surely to catastrophes that will harm our dear 
country most deeply. A request for a fatwa made for this odious aim is only 
bad deceit. However, if the objective is to know the truth and the divine 
law, in order to request from the popular government the revision of the 
articles contradicting the sharia’ regulation (ḥukm shar‘ī) and if the request 
is made in a way to avoid provoking disorder and trouble, then I want to 
reassure the authors of the request that I have done my duty and wrote to 
                                                
19 Women’s voting rights were discussed during the February 3, 1958 session of the Constituent Assembly. After a long 
debate, women’s right to vote was approved by a bare majority. See Munāqashāt, vol. 2,  83-92. 
 
the Ministry of justice to ask for modification of articles 14-18-19-21-30-
35-88.20 
 The provisions of these seven articles out of the 170 of the original 1956 Code were 
unacceptable in their substance to most Tunisian ulama except for a few who agreed to officially 
support the project on behalf of the state. The articles, which presented a significant departure 
from Muslim law, made repudiation a legal impediment to the remarriage of the husband, 
criminalized polygamy, and mandated that all divorce requests go through the courts.  On the 
whole, however, the PSC was in large part inspired by the Djait Code. The articles concerning 
descent, dowry, and inheritance respected Muslim law. The PSC also abolished constraint in 
marriage (jabr), replacing it with the mandatory mutual agreement of the prospective spouses, a 
provision that Djait had accepted.   
 Bourguiba was unwilling to put the matter of family law up for public deliberation, so the 
sharia courts were abolished, and their personnel integrated in the unified justice system by state 
decree in the fall of 1956. He had to act quickly, because the nationalization of the justice 
system, still in the hands of the French administration, was at stake. He wanted to prove to the 
French that Tunisia could have a secular and “modern” system of justice. The ulama felt that 
their own domain of activity was being threatened and indeed annihilated, and that the very 
substance of the sharia that they were supposed to interpret was disappearing from the law. 
Hence their opposition to the new Code was a defence of their professional body as well as a 
defence of the substance of the law. Since, however, as Shaykh Djait said, the ulama preferred to 
avoid provoking public disorder and sought to preserve “national unity”—and since Bourguiba 
                                                
20 Muḥammad al-‘Azīz J‘ayyit, “Jawāb ‘an al-istiftā’,” Al-Istiqlāl  47  September 14, 1956, 1. 
 
had the upper hand—a compromise was reached. The discussions in the Constituent Assembly 
were leading towards the recognition that Islam was “the religion of the state.” Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Tahar Ben Achour, a high ranking scholar who had been appointed Dean of the 
Zaytuna University at the time, gave his approval to the Code: “We give our full confidence to a 
government that has declared itself a Muslim government in its first fundamental law, to 
proclaim laws that are accepted by the elite and the whole community.”21 A quid pro quo had 
been established between part of the official ulama and Bourguiba’s regime. On the one hand, 
Bourguiba agreed to make Islam constitutive of the state through Article 1 of the Constitution, 
which by and large satisfied the ulama. On the other hand, however, the ulama had to accept the 
breaches of Islamic law in the Personal Status Code. The compromise was nonetheless based on 
an unequal balance of power. If the Code was criticized by the ulama, the contentious articles 
were never modified towards a more “Islamic” interpretation as Djait had hoped. In 1959, Article 
1 of the Constitution became a symbolic compensation for those who wanted Islam to remain a 
marker of the nation’s identity. Sharia had been invoked at length in the 1861 Constitution of the 
Tunisian Regency. It disappeared from both the 1959 Constitution and the 1956 family law. This 
fading of sharia, imposed through an unequal compromise by Bourguiba’s new state, has left, as 
we will see, indelible marks on Tunisian debates regarding Islam and secularism. 
Indeed, if the Personal Status Code itself did not invoke sharia, the official state 
narratives justifying the PSC insisted on the Code’s roots in sharia law as well as on its 
progressive and modernist aspects. The Code was deemed necessary to solve the problems 
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plaguing the legal system, such as the multiple jurisdictions and the dual Hanafi-Maliki system 
in family law. The preface to the 1958 edition of the Code stated that in the past the “mainstream 
opinions were to serve as a basis for judges and were even difficult to discern from the 
compendia written by the different theologians that diverged from one another on each issue.”22 
In order to resolve this issue, the Code made law transparent, public, and efficient: “Our modern 
times,” it read, “request that our litigations be adjudicated rapidly, and that an instrument that is 
easy to consult be put at the disposal of the judges and the litigants.”  In addition, the same 
preface described the Code as the product of a specific interpretation of sharia:  
The venerable Islamic legislation (al-tashrī‘ al-islāmī) represents justice with its 
universal principles and is also faithful to the needs of the human person whatever 
the times and the conditions. The 1932 international conference of The Hague on 
comparative law has recognized with respect and admiration that [the Islamic 
legislation] can be one source of comparative law. Hence, the drafter of the Code 
has chosen from the depths of this Islamic legislation what can respond to all 
these needs (…) with a style that is easy and understandable in all its parts and 
that can be accepted by the elites and be clear for the masses.23  
The “depths of [the] Islamic legislation” were a reference to sharia, but also to the fact that the 
ancient Islamic legislation was difficult for the masses to access. Because of its opacity, it had to 
be “rewritten” for clarity, and so that all of the members of the new nation would understand.  
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 However, once rewritten in a new language, sharia itself became even more unreachable. 
Sharia was still “venerable” and admired by Western scholars, in the words of the introduction to 
the Code.  But its social efficacy had to be attained by new means, that of a codified law whose 
process was entirely different from that of sharia law.24 Secular law was more able than sharia to 
be an instrument for the development and “modernization” of society. Even in absentia, 
however, sharia was objectified in this official narrative as a legislation “faithful to the needs of 
the human person whatever the times and the conditions,” which echoed the ulama’s conception 
of sharia law. Therefore, sharia was not totally erased from the narratives about the new Code. It 
became implicit, but, even in its implicitness, it remained all-encompassing because it was 
described as able to deal with all needs, in all times. The new Code itself, in its secular form, was 
equally totalizing: it was readable and understandable by all, a universally recognized and 
applicable law for all Tunisians that would reorganize their family lives. The August 3, 1956 
communiqué of the Ministry of Justice insisted on the legacy of the Djait Code as well as on the 
radically new format of the Code: “We avoided rare words, which only the jurists (fuqāhā’) 
specialized in these disciplines use, as well as words that do not correspond to the current tastes 
and practices… We have dealt with broad questions and important issues and have neglected the 
details, which we left to the judge who will solve them by looking at the main reference books 
and fundamental texts, if need be.”25 Judges often understood that the “main reference books and 
fundamental texts” meant that they could refer to Islamic law when the Code was silent on 
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certain issues. The implicitness of sharia law allowed it to reappear in legal cases, which showed 
that its domestication was not complete.26 
 After 1956 the PSC gained a high legal status in the hierarchy of Tunisian laws, 
comparable to that of the Constitution. The official state narratives have insisted on its 
“modernist” dimension as well as on its “Islamic legacy,” and have underlined the exceptionality 
of the Tunisian case in the Arab world. In 2006, at a conference celebrating the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Code in Qayrawan, the religious capital of Tunisia, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs reminded his audience that it was based on the Djait project and that the PSC was 
“inspired by Islam, which is considered as a whole, vast, coherent and indivisible.”27 This meant 
that, according to him, the codification of family law had not fragmented Islamic law by drawing 
from it only partially, but was comparable to its full translation. In the same publication, an 
article by Mongia Souaihi, a female professor at Zaytuna University, explained articles of the 
PSC through Koranic verses, underlining the “Islamic” character of the Code. The PSC had 
become itself a sacred creation of the state, neither because of its supposedly “religious” 
inspiration, nor by virtue of being interpreted through the Koran as Souaihi had done, but rather 
because it had become politically untouchable.  
 Since 1956 the dual insistences upon the “modern” and the “Islamic” characters of the 
Code have been shaped as the domain of the authoritarian state alone. Both modernism and Islam 
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were instrumentalized by the regimes of Bourguiba (1956-1987) and Ben Ali (1987-2011) in 
order to give meaning to shared values common to all Tunisians as well as in order to control 
political dissent. The Code was said to be modern because it emancipated women and gave them 
some of the rights and freedoms that women could enjoy in developed Western countries. At the 
same time, even though “modernity” was inspired by the Western model of women’s 
emancipation and gender equality, Islam also had to be asserted as compatible with that model. 
Islam and modernity were combined to try to balance the Islamist and secularist positions. In 
particular Islamists were kept at bay through references to the threat they allegedly presented to 
the Personal Status Code. The most secular reformists who demanded absolute equality, in 
particular in the laws of inheritance, were also turned down as being insensitive to Islamic 
values. In the speech he gave on the fiftieth anniversary of the Code, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs said: “President Ben Ali elevated the Personal Status Law to the same rank as the 
principles inscribed in the Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, which means that he raised this 
sensitive branch of law up to the highest legislative level.”28 He was alluding to the fact that the 
adherence to the Personal Status Code by political parties as a condition for their legal existence 
was added to the text of the constitution in 1997, justifying the exclusion of the main Islamist 
political movement, al-Nahdha, from the legal opposition.29  
II. Sharia as a Site of Memory and the Predominance of Religious Establishment 
 Participants in the 2006 Ministry of Religious Affairs conference did not note that, in 
contrast to the Djait project, the PSC had transformed sharia into an implicit category. On the 
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one hand, Djait’s project was a summary of legal provisions from Hanafi and Maliki law 
arranged vertically in two columns. It provided a flexible set of tools from which the judge could 
draw his rulings. On the other hand, the new 1956 Personal Status Code’s first editions were set 
out in two horizontal parts: first, the text of the law with its numbered chapters and articles 
occupying the top part of each page, and second, footnotes at the bottom of the page explaining 
the articles of the law. Contrary to the columns in the Djait law project, where no hierarchy 
separated the Hanafi and the Maliki interpretations of sharia, the body of the text of the new 
Code had a higher status than its footnotes. The former was the law, while the latter was only a 
commentary of the law, formulated through the exposition of its sources, its interpretations, and 
sometimes specific rulings that had occurred between 1956 and the second edition of the Code in 
1958.  This dual form of the 1956 PSC represented a domestication of the Islamic narrative and 
memory. On some pages, the footnotes occupied almost the totality of the space, leaving only 
one line to the law itself. The types of explanations provided were varied: they referred to 
treatises of fiqh and excerpts of the Koran, as well as to real cases in which the Code was 
applied. However, the footnotes did not only provide “explanation.” They also offered a context 
to the law, a background that helped one to read it in terms that differed from those of the newly 
codified rules. Indeed, they provided in part the religious “memory” of the law: not necessarily 
its exact historical origins, but rather its “equivalent” in the jurisprudential memory of the 
authors of the new Code. This memory constituted a layer of discourse that was explicit in the 
footnotes, but remained implicit in the personal status law itself. It was not practically usable as 
law, but was included to persuade the reader that the Personal Status Code was not foreign or 
exogenous to Tunisian and Muslim history. For instance, the first part of Article 5 stated: “each 
of the spouses must be pubescent and must not be in a situation of legal impediment (al-mawāni‘ 
al-shar‘iyya) to marriage.”30 This was accompanied by a footnote that read:  
Among the legal impediments to marriage is when the future husband is not Muslim and 
the future wife does not belong to one of the religions of the book or when she is an 
apostate (murtadda). This impediment is among the temporary ones according to the law 
(shar‘an), since it can be lifted by conversion. See Ibn Juzay p. 200.31 See His beloved 
book: “do not marry unbelieving women (idolaters), until they believe; a slave woman 
who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allure you. Nor marry 
(your girls) to unbelievers until they believe: a male slave who believes is better than 
unbeliever, even though he allure you. Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the fire. But 
God beckons by His grace to the Garden (of Bliss) and forgiveness, and makes His Signs 
clear to mankind: that they may celebrate His praise.32  
In this case, the Islamic law explicitly served as a reference through the quote of Ibn Juzay, a 
Maliki jurist, and through the mention of the Quranic verse, even if the word shari‘a was not 
used. However, the use of the word shar‘ (which means revelation as well as law) remained 
ambiguous, all the more so in the French version of the Code where al-mawāni‘ al-shari‘iyya 
was translated by “empêchement légal,” and shar‘an by “au regard de la loi.”33 These 
formulations created ambiguity because they avoided responding to the following question: was 
the law referred to in the footnotes of the new Code the sharia or the secular law? It is worth 
noting that in subsequent printings of the PSC the extensive footnote apparatus disappeared, but 
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that new and separate textual productions from official governmental sources continued to 
underline the Code’s origin in Islamic law. The use of sharia as a reference also produced a 
reification of the idea of sharia. It became a distant and obscure object, especially after its 
elimination from the late printings of the Code. Hence its presence as a reference had to be 
regularly reasserted in official publications, as if the PSC could not do without a site of memory 
(lieu de mémoire), reminding Tunisians of the historical relation of the Code to sharia.34  In 
Tunisian religious, legal, and political history, sharia remains implicit and unstable. It haunts the 
margins of the PSC, always changing sites, from state official publications to jurisprudential 
interpretations. 
Tunisian secularists are well aware of the fact that asserting that the sharia is a reference 
for the Code makes sharia a renewed object of attention, and hence renders the Tunisian law 
susceptible to being viewed as “religious law” or to accusations that it is not “religious” enough. 
They often deplore even the implicit character of sharia, and therefore reject the idea that sharia 
is “a reference” of the family law. For instance, Ali Mezghani, a Tunisian specialist of 
international private law, has reiterated that there is a radical gap between the PSC and sharia. In 
1975 he wrote: “some authors still try to relate the solutions of positive Tunisian law to classical 
Muslim law or to fill the silences of the positive law with references to solutions offered by the 
different schools of Muslim law. Others, however, not being able to find a justification in 
Muslim law (for instance for the legalization of adoption or the prohibition of polygamy) attempt 
to establish these institutions with a reference to the spirit of Islam, which must be modernized. 
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Islamic law is dead. Long live Islamic law.”35 For Mezghani the idea of a continuity between 
“Muslim law”—whose existence he also questions, since for him what is usually called “Muslim 
law” is not “religious”—and the current Tunisian law is only a political argument used to build 
support of the positive law by the population. For him the reading of Tunisian law as having its 
formal source in Muslim law is mistaken, and one must recognize the disappearance of sharia, 
which exists only as part of the far historical origin of Tunisian positive law. According to 
Mezghani, when positive law is silent on certain issues, judges unfortunately often interpret 
cases following Muslim law. Judges should, on the contrary, rule on these cases with the 
“modernist” and “progressive” intent of the legislator in mind.  The recourse to “the main 
reference books and fundamental texts, if need be,” which was evoked by the Minister of Justice 
in 1956 for cases where the Code was silent, should not allow judges to interpret cases following 
Islamic law. For Mezghani Tunisian family law, as positive law, should speak by itself for itself 
and should not be related to an incommensurable and radically different system of law, such as 
Muslim law, in order to be interpreted. Hence for Mezghani, as well as for the secularists among 
Tunisian legal experts, positive law cannot be a translation of Muslim law, because these two 
laws belong to two radically different legal universes. This rejection of legal pluralism—
although adopted and invoked by the state—is in part due to the fact that Mezghani sees law as 
lacking “a proper history.”36 Because law—whether called sharia or not—is only the secular 
result of socio-economic conditions, he argues, law can only be positive law. Whereas 
historically Tunisian society produced a legal system called “sharia,” or shar‘—literally 
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revelation—the radical transformations of Tunisian society and economy due to foreign 
influence and colonization in the nineteenth century necessitated a shift to an entirely different 
legal system. 
 Hence, while Tunisian secularists such as Mezghani posited a radical discontinuity 
between sharia and positive law, state narratives insisted on a religious genealogy of the positive 
law. They used this genealogy rooted in implicit sharia to attempt to reassert the state’s own 
religious legitimacy. They also emphasized the law's progressive character in order to keep at 
bay the conservative ulama and later the Islamist political opposition. However, in the eyes of 
many Tunisians, the authoritarian foreclosing of any public debate on these issues only made the 
state’s efforts to characterize the law sound like empty rhetoric and drew secularists and 
Islamists even further apart. 
  In the new context of the political transition of 2011-2012, Rached Ghannouchi, the 
Islamist party al-Nahdha’s leader and main ideologue, participated in the paradigm produced by 
the post-colonial modern state, rather than countering this dynamic by focusing on the question 
of sharia. In his writings, he often associates secularism (‘almāniyya) with authoritarianism and 
modernity (ḥadātha). In an article published in 2011, he criticized the “secularist project” and 
defined it as “the marginalization of religion and its estrangement from the struggles of life.”37 In 
his view the task of the Islamist movement is to “reestablish the relationship between religion 
and life and the leadership of religion over life.”38 For Ghannouchi, “modernization,” the 
hallmark of the secularists, cannot be acceptable within a secular environment, but only in an 
                                                
37 Rashid Ghannushi, “Is the Islamist movement’s project retreating?” in Al-haraka al-islāmiyya, ru’ya naqdiyya, al-
intishār al-‘arabī, ed. Mustapha al-Habbab (Beyrout: Muʼassasat al-intishār al-ʻarabī : Ṣināʻat al-fikr lil-dirāsāt wa-al-
tadrīb, 2011) 36-37. 
38 Ibid. 
Islamic framework, since the Islamist project is one that embraces all aspects of life.39 Hence 
Islam, in order to avoid losing its own integrity, has to “penetrate” (ikhtirāq) modernity, rather 
than the reverse,40 His critique of secularism is common among those who advocate for religious 
participation in public life. However, Ghannouchi’s project is not that of a liberal critique of 
secularism. José Casanova, in his discussion of public religions, envisioned the inclusion of 
religion in the public arena as legitimate in liberal secular democracies, as long as religion did 
not penetrate the state or political society.41 By contrast, Ghannouchi does not envision, in a 
future Tunisian democracy, a separation of religion and state: in the very words of Article 1 of 
the 1959 Constitution, Islam is for him and for his movement “the religion of the state.”  Thus 
for Ghannouchi religion is public in its maximalist sense, as opposed to being “public” in the 
liberal version of Casanova’s public religions. The mainstream Tunisian Islamist movement 
proposes religious establishment and democracy.  
  Of course the insistence on the question of the state rather than on that of sharia is related 
to the fact that al-Nahdha is as much a political party interested in governing the country and 
participating in the administration of the state as it is a religious social movement. Hence its 
members are much more interested in policy making than in reflecting on legal issues and on the 
question of sharia. This means that, for this movement, the issues related to the implementation 
of sharia are simply not relevant for its own mode of governance. This is not to say that the 
party, who came to power in the fall of 2011, did not craft policies and propose legislation based 
on religious principles. It means that the party operates in the framework of the modern state and 
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insists on using more secular concepts than “sharia”—such as popular will, democracy, and 
electoral participation—and modern concepts such as “religion” to speak about its own political 
project.42 However, the relationship between the state and religion remains ambivalent in the 
thought of al-Nahdha’s activists. On the one hand, they clearly articulate a desire to liberate 
religion from state domination: the first 2011 post-revolutionary issues of their weekly journal 
al-Fajr contained several articles demanding “the liberation of the mosques.”43 On the other 
hand, they also insist that the state must organize (tanzīm) religion without controlling it.44  
  For al-Nahdha, liberation of Islam from the control of the state does not mean separation 
of state and religion, or even neutrality on the part of the state towards religion, in the way that 
liberal secularism is understood at least theoretically. The state Ghannouchi envisions is a civil 
and democratic state, but it must engage with religion in specific ways, to organize it, but also to 
implement it.  Ghannouchi's liberation of Islam from the state occasions no rupture between 
them. Rather, the state is put at the service of religion, and it is up to those democratically elected 
to govern the state and to define the ways in which this “service” operates. It is striking that 
Ghannouchi does not speak of implementing sharia (tatbīq al-shari'a, a phrase widely used by 
other Islamist movements), but rather of “Islamic implementation” (tatbīq islāmī), a concept on 
which he does not elaborate and that allows him to avoid tackling the issue of sharia.45 
Ghannouchi’s writings on the Personal Status Code are also brief, but they illustrate his focus on 
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the issue of state establishment of religion rather than on legal matters.  His critique of the 1956 
Personal Status Code was not a critique of the substance of the law per se. As such, it strikingly 
contrasted with the criticism of the PSC by Shaykh Djait who focused on the content of specific 
articles of the Code.  
Ghannouchi developed a more sociological approach to what the PSC meant for Tunisian 
society broadly:  
Bourguiba’s regime, charmed with the West … violently destroyed the pillars of ancient 
society, without discerning the good from the bad. He was convinced that the 
emancipation of women was the best way to participate in civilization. Then came the 
Personal Status Code. It was not merely a set of laws that reformed the legal status of 
women, but it came accompanied and followed by a revolution that stormed ancient 
society in its entirety.46  
Ghannouchi was not against the Code itself, but rather against the broader transformation of 
Tunisian society that the state had initiated with the PSC and other modernization policies. 
Although this critique of state policies is central in the writings of al-Nahdha activists, it does not 
lead them to deepen their reflections about the legitimacy and the practical operations of 
religious establishment: How would their party, if it came in power, make the state “Muslim”? 
This question, rather than the issue of sharia and sharia’s content, has animated the debate 
between secularist and Islamist activists after the uprisings of 2010-2011 and the departure of 
Ben Ali. In that sense, sharia has remained as implicit as it used to be. 
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III. Varieties of Religious Establishments in Post-revolutionary Tunisia 
During the weeks following January 14, 2011, the interim government charged the 
Committee for Political Reforms (CPR) with proposing a path for the political transition. Ben Ali 
had announced its creation in his speech to the nation on January 13. Its tasks included drafting 
any necessary new legal articulations, such as amendments to the Constitution or laws on 
political parties, elections, and the press. Headed by Yadh Ben Achour, a well-known Tunisian 
expert on public law and Muslim political theory, the CPR was a small and independent 
committee of experts. On February 3, 2011, commenting on the tasks of the CPR in a televised 
interview, Yadh Ben Achour declared that he approved the election of a Constituent Assembly 
and the foundation of a “second republic.”47  
According to Ben Achour the laws organizing politics were in need of a radical 
transformation since it was under a well-tailored legal apparatus that authoritarianism had 
operated since independence. In particular the previous regimes successively revised the 
Constitution and the laws regulating the press and the political parties to further their 
authoritarian agendas. There needed to be “a new state,” a concept that al-Nahdha’s Islamists 
agreed with. The point was reiterated to me by Ajmi Lourimi, a member of al-Nahdha party’s 
Political Bureau, during our meeting on June 9, 2011. However, Ben Achour added, one law 
remained central, and could not be put into question because it was “the real constitution of 
Tunisia”: the 1956 Personal Status Code. It was, he insisted, the first legal text of independent 
Tunisia and became law before the Constitution of 1959 was proclaimed. Its principles 
constituted a “republican gain” (maksab jumhūrī).   
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But the Tunisian people were “not yet at the level of the PSC”: “How can we improve 
relationships within the family? We need decades! The Code is comparable to the first Tunisian 
constitution. It would be a mistake [to change it]. What if a [political] party obtained the majority 
of seats and wanted to change it? We should say: there are principles we cannot change.”48 Ben 
Achour, grandson of Shaykh al-Tahar Ben Achour, who had acquiesced to the Personal Status 
Code in 1956, looked at the PSC as more progressive than the people it sought to change and 
regulate. For him the Code had been established by Bourguiba in order to transform Tunisian 
family and society. It had to serve as a tool for social engineering, but had not entirely 
accomplished its task yet.   
According to Yadh Ben Achour, the PSC’s “primeval” status in the chronology of the 
legal history of independent Tunisia and its comparability to a constitutional text made it an 
inalterable law that needed to remain a solidly and broadly legal foundation in post Ben Ali 
Tunisia. It is noteworthy that in the same interview Ben Achour also declared that Article 1 of 
the 1959 Constitution stating that Islam is the “religion of the state” should remain in the future 
constitution. While he did not elaborate upon his understanding of this article’s meaning, he 
insisted on what he viewed as two central pillars in the legal future of Tunisia: women’s rights 
and Islam as the state’s religion, a position that converged with the state reformist options that 
President Bourguiba and his entourage had chosen since the independence of Tunisia.     
During the year 2011, a period of political instability and uncertainty, when politicians 
and activists were looking for and vigorously debating possible paths to democratic transition, 
the themes of the Personal Status Code and of “the relationships between religion and the state” 
were at the forefront of public debates. They seemed tightly connected and were becoming at 
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least as prominent as issues such as the economy, the independence of the justice system, the 
separation of powers, or human rights. Opinion articles, televised debates, street demonstrations, 
and opinion polls expressed deep-seated anxieties about these two issues. Women’s rights and 
the relationship between state and religion were seen as interconnected and as central to the 
definition of the constitutional and political future of Tunisia. This was because the post-colonial 
state had originally defined and shaped “Islam” and “women rights” as two domains essential for 
its authoritarian fashioning of society. The PSC in particular was seen as “exceptional” by 
Tunisian politicians and legal scholars. It was seen as standing out among all other family codes 
in the Arab world.49  
Women’s progress and Islam, as expressed in legal narratives, were indeed two 
foundational elements in the construction of the post-colonial state. There were continuities with 
the French colonial endeavors to reform law and liberate women from traditional Tunisian mores 
such as the wearing of the veil and seclusion.50 From the modernist and secularist Tunisian state 
elites’ point of view, the state drew its identity from Islam and protected women’s rights through 
its legislative enterprises. During the post-colonial period, this progressive agenda went hand in 
hand with an authoritarian one: Islam was under the regulatory control of the state, which shaped 
its meaning and the authorized locations of its manifestations. Feminism was also a narrative that 
was the prerogative of the state whose elites mobilized women at its service.51 It was not just that 
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these two domains had to be protected, but, more essentially, they fell under the control of the 
state, which guaranteed their permanence through an exercise of authority.  Each of these 
domains defined the limits of the other: women’s rights countered conservative interpretations of 
Islam, and Islam limited women’s rights. The state, as guardian of both domains, could therefore 
control each one of them with the help of the other.  
After the revolution of January 14, 2011, as the state’s authority was weakened and often 
put into question by a recalcitrant civil society, the principles at the foundation of the PSC and 
Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution were at stake.  The Islamists, in particular, drew the public’s 
attention to the fact that the modernist character of the previous regimes’ state policies had been, 
for more than 50 years, related to authoritarianism. However, it is quite remarkable that the issue 
of sharia law was purposely marginalized by the dominant political elites in favor of the larger 
idea of “Islam” as the “religion of the state.” 
Since democracy is now the declared project of both Islamists and secularists, it is 
important to address how they all envisioned religious establishment in a democratic state. A few 
months after the departure of Ben Ali, the responses to this question varied, but it is possible to 
differentiate between the two camps’ positions. Among al-Nahdha’s Islamists the prevailing and 
official view was that “Islam is the religion of the state” in the sense that the identity of Tunisia 
as a country is Islamic, the majority of its citizens being Muslim. According to Ajmi Lourimi,  
We found this article [Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution] in front of us. It 
does not pose a problem. There is little contention around this. There is a 
minority that is afraid that if the government changes and if there is a new 
majority that takes over, article 1 will be used to change the laws. These 
fears have no basis, because this article only gives an identity to the 
Tunisian people, to the political aspect of Tunisia, and to Tunisian society. 
Even in France there are discussions about the identity of the people. We 
see that on television. European politicians discuss it. They discuss the flag, 
the values, their own history. … In the end, when we speak about identity, 
Europe remains Christian in its history, Christian in its civilization, in 
particular when defining itself vis-à-vis Islam. This is a matter for 
discussion: how is the regime of Republican France going to deal with 
Muslims? Is there going to be integration? What about the religious 
symbols of Islam? This is what is discussed. There is a way in which the 
French Republic will adapt. And this happens even in regimes that are 
secular.52 
 According to Lourimi, Article 1 defined the identity of Tunisia.  
Lourimi asserted that any state, even a secular one, necessarily engages with religion 
when dealing with identity matters: “In the end, when we speak about identity, Europe remains 
Christian.” In particular, for Lourimi, the Tunisian state must organize Islam administratively: it 
must continue to provide and maintain religious structures such as mosques, religious education 
in public schools, the administration organizing the pilgrimage to Mecca, etc. However, it should 
not have its say in the content of religious narratives and interpretations, which should be freely 
produced. For example, religious authorities should be dissociated from the state, and even 
elected by the people, according to Lourimi.53 For him, since al-Nahdha envisions the state as a 
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civil state and not a theocracy, democracy and religious establishment should lead to a 
“liberated” public Islam, with no religious monopoly by the state or by any political party. 
Lourimi presented a liberal conception of religious establishment that allows space for 
individual religious and political rights, but diminished with a certain irony the secularists’ own 
insistence on their liberty to conduct their personal lives—which he reduced to their alimentary 
habits and their dress—in the way they see fit:  
I am interested in Habermas who has written on these issues. He says that 
secularism diminishes the religious perspective and excludes (iqsā’iyya) 
religion from the public space … In Israel, it is not the case that citizenship 
is separated from religion. There are religious parties and secularist parties. 
All have the same status. They can even collaborate and ally. If society is 
pluralist, this can work and religious parties can be legal and legitimate. We 
have the legal and political framework. There is a set of values that are not 
negotiable: the individual’s right to life, expression, political participation, 
and work. These are the main basic principles that will prevent us to go 
back, to go back to barbarism, to tyranny (zulm) ... This is why the fears [on 
the part of the secularists] are not legitimate according to me. The Islamist 
movements are afraid for Islam, and the secularists are afraid of Islam. And 
the secularists are afraid for their own individual way of life. They are 
afraid for their own individual rights. But their fears are not about political 
rights, or citizenship rights, or religious rights. They are afraid not to be 
able to buy their wine, not to be able to dress the way they want.54 
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This characterization of secularists as not interested in defending individual political rights is 
certainly an exaggerated description, especially coming from Lourimi, who collaborated in the 
October 18 movement, a coalition started in 2005 between members of secular left parties and al-
Nahdha. Indeed, in the same interview, he also described to me al-Nahdha’s political alliance 
with the activists of the secular left before the revolution and his respect for the latter. However, 
it is instructive that the Islamists see the secularists as not protecting human rights in general, but 
rather as safeguarding a way of life that Islamists often associate with Western modernity, in 
particular French culture and mores (alcohol consumption and western dress). 
Tunisian secularists, on the other hand, want a “secular establishment of Islam”—that is, 
a secular society without separation of state and religion. For them true democracy, in the 
context of establishment, will be enough to guarantee that religion does not contradict individual 
rights. Riadh Guerfali, whom I quoted earlier in this chapter, drew a difference between laïcité 
and secularism that echoed Lourimi’s comparison between the French and Israeli systems. He 
also distanced himself from the French model of laïcité:  
Laïcité is a total rupture between the state and religion. Contrary to laïcité, 
secularism needs, in order to succeed, the affirmation of a relationship between 
state and religion … What will be the meaning of ‘Islam religion of the state’ in 
the future constitution of Tunisia? We still doubt that this phrase could be defined 
precisely. Since January 14, 2011, we know what it cannot be: it must not go 
against what Tunisians died for… that is the demand that the dignity of persons be 
respected. This dignity cannot be detached from the respect of fundamental 
freedoms and from the guarantees that protect the citizen in a democratic state. To 
summarize, the meaning that we give to the statement that Islam is “the religion 
of the state” does not matter. What is non-negotiable after January 14 is that this 
principle’s meaning must not contradict these freedoms. And this is already a 
crucial definition ... There is no need to eliminate from the constitution the 
statement that will allow the state to control the religious field, but there is a need 
to consolidate the necessary laws that will allow us to have a secularized 
democracy. 
To make even clearer the secularist project of a religious establishment in a democratic Tunisia 
he wrote, “By appropriating religion, we will keep a more or less tight control on the religious 
field so that it does not contradict the democratic project.”55 
Very few politicians in Tunisia envision the possibility of separating religion and the 
state. However, as we saw, there are two different perspectives on religious establishment in 
Tunisia. The Islamists’ vision is that of an establishment that liberates religion from the tight 
control of the state but keeps it under its protection. This vision will leave open spaces for 
narratives on the continuity between the secular law and sharia, similar to those of the previous 
regimes. It is noteworthy that Rached Ghannouchi, right after coming back from exile, declared 
that he accepted the Personal Status Code because it mostly derived from sharia. However, when 
the Islamists came to govern the state in November 2011, sharia was not made more explicit. Al-
Nadha envisioned religious establishment as protective of “sacred values” (muqaddasāt) when 
one of the party’s representatives in the Constituent Assembly drafted a bill in favor of 
penalizing offenses to “sacred values.” In that sense they were in perfect continuity with the 
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press law of 1975, used by the previous regime, which stated that “belittling the dignity (nayl 
min karāma) of an authorized religion” was a criminal offense (article 48).56  
For the Islamists freedom has its limits, which are set by Islamic values. For the 
secularists, on the other hand, the interpretation of establishment is one that will allow control of 
religion by the state and the silencing of any sharia-based project. In that sense secularists do not 
differ much from either of the previous political regimes of Tunisia in their definition of 
religious establishment. Even though they agree with Islamists on the project of democracy, they 
still envision the state as the strongest regulator and restrainer of religion. While they want 
establishment to take place in a democratic framework, they do not seem to think that state 
control of religion can impair democracy. This does not mean that secularists are anti-
democratic, but rather that they are not ready to accept all the consequences of religious freedom. 
That is, they are not prepared to embrace the effects of a liberal secularism that would allow the 
nation’s whole range of religious actors and organizations to operate freely in the public sphere. 
This Tunisian brand of secularism is at odds with a vast literature that describes 
secularism as necessarily coextensive with “liberalism.”57 Indeed, as the Tunisian example 
shows, the exclusion of religion from the public sphere can take place through religious 
establishment and this even under an authoritarian regime such as before January 14, 2011. What 
is even more striking is that Tunisian secularists, who declare their attachment to democracy, are 
not ready to “liberalize” the religious sphere in the name of individual freedoms for fear that it 
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would threaten the very existence of a secular society. Hence projects of secularism can be 
expressed in many institutional and political forms. They can be found in separation or 
establishment, in liberal democratic forms and in more authoritarian forms of governance. Over 
the long term, the political transformations spearheaded by the Arab uprisings will reveal new 
forms of relations between the state and religion and will display new varieties of secularism that 
will be produced not just by the traditional “secular” segments of these societies, but also by the 
so-called “Islamists.” If we define secularism merely as the organization and regulation of any 
type of religious presence through specific institutional arrangements, then religious 
establishment is in itself a form of secularism, whether it is establishment as interpreted by the 
secularists or by the Islamists.   
 
